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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Halton Flowers appeals from the sentence imposed upon his guilty plea to 
rape and from the district court's order denying his post-sentencing motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In August 2007 police received information that 24-year-old Flowers had 
sexual intercourse with 16-year-old AC., fondled and digitally penetrated 14-
year-old A.T.'s vagina, and attempted to fondle 15-year-old H.T.'s breasts and 
vagina, all within a one-week period. (R., pp.27, 31, 79-80; PSI, p.2.) The state 
charged Flowers with rape, lewd conduct with a child under 16, and attempted 
lewd conduct with a child under 16. (R., pp.79-81.) Pursuant to a plea 
agreement, Flowers pled guilty to rape and the state dismissed the remaining 
charges and agreed to recommend a unified sentence of ten years, with three 
years fixed. (R., pp.165-67; 11/10108 Tr., p.1, Ls.13-22.) The district court 
imposed a unified sentence of 15 years, with five years fixed. (R., pp.168-70.) 
Flowers filed a timely Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence, which the district 
court denied. (R., pp.171-72, 181a-181b.) Flowers filed a notice of appeal, 
timely from the judgment. (R., pp.173-75.) 
Nine months later, while his appeal was pending, Flowers filed a motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea and an affidavit in support thereof. (Augmentation: 
"Motion to Withdraw Plea of Guilty" (hereinafter cited as "Motion") and "Affidavit 
Of Defendant" (hereinafter cited as "Affidavit").) As the bases for his motion, 
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Flowers asserted: (1) his plea was not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily 
made because he was not advised, prior to entry of the plea, of the requirement 
that he register as a sex offender, in violation of I.C.R. 11(d)(2); (2) the district 
court never actually accepted the plea; and (3) the state breached the plea 
agreement both at sentencing and at the hearing on Flowers' Rule 35 motion. 
(Motion, p.2; Affidavit, pp.1-3.) After a hearing, the district court denied the 
motion, ruling that Flowers had failed to establish any manifest injustice entitling 
him to withdraw his plea. (Augmentation: "Order Denying Motion To Withdraw 
Plea Of Guilty Pursuant To I.C.R. 33(c) And Idaho Code § 19-1714" (hereinafter 
cited as "Order"); 11/10109 Tr., p.3, L.8 - p.4, L.11.) 
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ISSUES 
Flowers states the issues on appeal as: 
[1.] . Whether the district court erred in denying the Rule 33 
motion for withdrawal of guilty plea[?] 
[2.] Did the district court abuse its discretion by sentencing the 
defendant to 15 years with the first 5 years fixed? 
(Set forth, respectively, at Supplemental Brief Of Appellant ("Supplemental 
Brief'). p.2; Appellant's Brief, p.3.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Flowers failed to establish an abuse of discretion in the denial of his 
post-sentencing motion for withdrawal of his guilty plea? 
2. Has Flowers failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion 
in imposing a unified sentence of 15 years, with five years fixed, upon his 
guilty plea to rape? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Flowers Has Failed To Establish An Abuse Of Discretion In The Denial Of His 
Post-Sentencing Motion For Withdrawal Of His Guilty Plea 
A. Introduction 
Flowers contends that the district court abused its discretion in denying his 
post-sentencing motion to withdraw his guilty plea. (Supplemental Brief, pp. 1 0-
22.) The record, however, supports the district court's determination that 
Flowers failed to demonstrate any manifest injustice entitling him to withdraw his 
plea. Flowers has failed to establish an abuse of discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Appellate review of the denial of a motion to withdraw a plea is limited to 
determining whether the district court exercised sound judicial discretion, as 
distinguished from arbitrary action. State v. Dopp, 124 Idaho 481,483,861 P.2d 
51,53 (1993); State v. Carrasco, 117 Idaho 295,298,787 P.2d 281, 284 (1990); 
State v. Jackson, 96 Idaho 584, 587, 532 P.2d 926, 929 (1975). On appeal from 
the denial of a post-sentencing motion to withdraw a guilty plea, the appellate 
court examines the entire record to determine whether it is manifestly unjust to 
preclude the defendant from withdrawing a guilty plea. State v. Banuelos, 124 
Idaho 569,574,861 P.2d 1234, 1239 (Ct. App. 1993). 
C. Flowers Failed To Establish Any Manifest Injustice Entitling Him To 
Withdraw His Guilty Plea 
Generally, a motion for withdrawal of a guilty plea will not be granted after 
sentencing. State v. Carrasco, 117 Idaho 295,298,787 P.2d 281, 284 (1990); 
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Hoover v. State, 114 Idaho 145, 146, 754 P.2d 458, 459 (Ct. App. 1988). A 
court may permit a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea after sentencing only 
upon a satisfactory showing by the defendant that withdrawal of the guilty plea is 
necessary to correct a "manifest injustice." I.C.R. 33(c). The strictness of the 
standard is justified by the legal weight of the guilty plea. "A plea of guilty has 
the same force and effect as a judgment rendered after a full trial on the merits." 
Schmidt v. State, 103 Idaho 340, 346, 647 P.2d 796, 802 (Ct. App. 1982). The 
stricter standard also insures that the defendant is not "encouraged to plead 
guilty to test the weight of potential punishment and withdraw the plea if the 
sentence is unexpectedly severe." State v. Stone, 147 Idaho 330, 333, 208 P.3d 
734, 737 (Ct. App. 2009). The defendant has the burden of proving that the plea 
should be withdrawn. kL.; State v. Gomez, 124 Idaho 177, 178, 857 P.2d 656, 
657 (Ct. App. 1993). 
Flowers asserts several bases he contends rise to the level of manifest 
injustice entitling him to withdraw his plea. He has failed, however, to satisfy his 
burden of showing an abuse of discretion by the district court. 
1. Flowers Has Failed To Show Entitlement To Withdrawal Of His 
Plea Based Upon His Unfounded Claims That The District Court 
Never Actually Accepted His Plea Or That It Did So In Violation Of 
I.C.R. 11(c) 
Flowers pled guilty to statutory rape in exchange for the dismissal of the 
other charges alleged in the Information. (11/10108 Tr., p.1, L.13 - p.2, L.10.) 
After establishing a factual basis for the plea (11/10108 Tr., p.2, L.11 - p.3, L.6), 
the district court stated: "I accept the plea of guilty to count one, and I'll grant the 
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state's motion, count two is dismissed, count three is dismissed" (11/10/08 Tr., 
p.3, Ls.7-9). The court then engaged in an extensive colloquy with Flowers to 
establish the voluntariness of his plea but never again explicitly stated that it was 
accepting his plea. (See generally, 11/10/08 Tr., pp.3-10.) 
As he did below, Flowers argues as a basis for withdrawal of his plea that 
the district court never actually accepted his plea. (Supplemental Brief, pp.20-
21; see also Motion, p.2; Affidavit, p.2.) This claim is entirely without merit 
because, as even Flowers' appellate counsel acknowledges (see Supplemental 
Brief, p.21), the district court explicitly stated that it accepted Flowers' plea after 
Flowers entered it and agreed there was a factual basis to support it (11/10/08 
Tr., p.2, LA - p.3, L.9). Flowers' unfounded claim that the district court never 
accepted his plea does not show any manifest injustice, or even a "just reason," 
entitling him to withdraw his plea. 
As an altemative basis for withdrawal of his plea, Flowers argues on 
appeal that the district court violated I.C.R. 11 (c) by stating that it accepted 
Flowers' guilty plea before ensuring that the plea was knowingly and voluntarily 
entered. (Supplemental Brief, pp.21-22.) Flowers did not advance this argument 
in his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and, as such, the argument is not 
properly before this Court on appeal. State v. Stone, 147 Idaho 330, 333-34, 
208 P.3d 734, 737-38 (Ct. App. 2009) (basis for withdrawal of plea not raised to 
the trial court was not preserved for consideration on appeal); see also State v. 
Martin, 119 Idaho 577, 579, 808 P.2d 1322, 1324 (1991) (issues not raised 
below will not be considered for the first time on appeal); State v. Mauro, 121 
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Idaho 178, 181, 824 P.2d 109, 112 (1991) (same); State v. Nevarez, 142 Idaho 
616,623, 130 P.3d 1154, 1161 (Ct. App. 2005) (same). However, even if this 
Court considers the merits of Flowers' claim, Flowers has failed to show any 
violation of the rule, much less a violation entitling him to withdraw his plea. 
When a defendant enters a guilty plea, I.C.R. 11 (c) requires a showing 
from the record of the entire proceedings that the plea is constitutionally valid 
before the court accepts it. See I.C.R. 11 (c) ("Before a plea of guilty is accepted, 
the record of the entire proceedings ... must show" that the plea is voluntary, that 
the defendant was informed of the direct consequences of the plea, that the 
defendant was advised of the constitutional rights he would waive by pleading 
guilty, and whether the plea rests on any promises or is the result of a plea 
agreement). Although the district court only explicitly stated that it was accepting 
Flowers' plea before it specifically inquired of Flowers regarding the 
voluntariness of his plea, it is clear from a review of record that the court actually 
accepted the plea only after determining it was knowingly, intelligently and 
voluntarily made. 
After being advised of the plea bargain and establishing a factual basis for 
the plea, the district court engaged Flowers in an extensive plea colloquy, during 
which it established that Flowers was not under the influence of any alcohol or 
drugs and that Flowers was satisfied with his attorney's representation. 
(11/10108 Tr., p.3, Ls.9-25.) The court advised Flowers of the maximum 
sentence he could receive and also advised him of the constitutional rights he 
would be waiving by pleading guilty. (11/10108 Tr., p.4, Ls.1-17.) Flowers 
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indicated that he understood the maximum penalty and the rights he would be 
waiving. (11/10108 Tr., pA, Ls.6, 18.) He also indicated that his attorney had 
explained to him what facts the state would have to prove to convict him. 
(11/10108 Tr., pA, L.19 - p.5, L.12.) Flowers advised the court that nobody had 
threatened him or made any promises to get him to plead guilty. (11/10108 Tr., 
p.5, Ls.13-18.) He also assured the court that he was pleading guilty of his own 
free will pursuant to the plea agreement, which he understood was not binding 
on the court, and asked to court to accept his plea. (11/10/08 Tr., p.5, L.19 -
p.6, L.19.) At the conclusion of the colloquy, the court asked the parties whether 
there was any reason it should not accept Flowers' plea. (11/10/08 Tr., p.6, L.20 
- p.?, L.21.) There being none, the court ordered a PSI and a mental health 
evaluation for use at sentencing, set a date for sentencing and remanded 
Flowers to custody pending the sentencing hearing. (11/10/08 Tr., p.?, L.22 -
p.10, L.9.) 
Flowers' argument on appeal - that the district court never accepted his 
plea "after establishing the requirements of a valid plea mandated by I.C.R. 
11(c)" (Supplemental Brief, p.22) - is belied by the record. While it is true that 
the court never explicitly stated that it accepted the plea after determining that it 
was voluntary, the state is unaware of any requirement, and Flowers has cited to 
none, that requires the court to actually utter the words "I accept your plea" in 
order to convey that it has done so. Flowers concedes that the court did, in fact, 
establish the requirements for a constitutionally valid plea pursuant to I.C.R. 
11(c). (Supplemental Brief, pp.21-22.) That the court actually accepted Flowers' 
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plea after establishing the Rule 11 (c) requirements is evidenced, at least 
implicitly, by the fact that the court asked the parties whether there was any 
reason it should not accept the plea and, hearing none, ordered a PSI and 
mental health evaluation and set the case for sentencing. Because the record 
shQws that the court accepted Flowers' plea only after determining it was 
knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily entered, Flowers has failed to show any 
violation of I.C.R 11 (c), much less a violation rising to the level of manifest 
injustice entitling him to withdraw his plea. 
2. The Violation Of I.C.R. 11(d)(2) Does Not Rise To Level Of 
Manifest Injustice Entitling Flowers To Withdraw His Plea 
Idaho Criminal Rule 11 (d)(2) states that, if a defendant is pleading guilty 
to an offense requiring registration on the sex offender registry, the district court 
"shall, prior to entry of [the] plea or the making of factual admissions during a 
plea cplloquy ... inform the defendant of such registration requirements." The 
district court failed at the change of plea hearing to advise Flowers of the 
requirement that he register as a sex offender. (See generally 11/10/08 Tr .. ) 
Contrary to Flowers' claims both below and on appeal (Supplemental Brief, 
pp.18-20; Motion, p.2; Affidavit, p.2), however, the violation of Rule 11 (d)(2) does 
not rise to the level of either a due process violation or manifest injustice entitling 
Flowers to withdraw his plea. 
Idaho Criminal Rule 11 (c), not 11 (d), establishes the minimum 
constitutional requirements for accepting a guilty plea. The requirements of Rule 
11(c) constitute procedural safeguards "to protect the underlying constitutional 
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requirements that guilty please be entered voluntarily, knowingly and 
intelligently." State v. Weber, 140 Idaho 89, 95, 90 P.3d 314, 320 (2004). 
Where, as here, "the record indicates that the trial court followed the 
reqUirements of Rule 11 (c), this is a prima facie showing that the plea is 
voluntary and knowing." Weber, 140 Idaho at 95, 90 P.3d at 320. However, 
because the procedures of Rule 11 (c) are not. themselves constitutionally 
mandated, a violation of the rule does not, by itself, rise to a due process 
violation rendering the plea invalid. United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 
U.S. 74, 83 (2004); United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 783 (1979) (a 
technical violation of Rule 11 is neither a constitutional nor jurisdictional defect); 
Weber, 140 Idaho at 95, 90 P.3d at 320. 
Unlike the requirements of I.C.R. 11(c), the requirements of I.C.R.11 (d) do 
not protect constitutional rights. Rather, the provisions of Rule 11(d) address 
certain collateral consequences a defendant may face as a result of his or her 
plea. See,~, Ray v. State, 133 Idaho 96, 101, 982 P.2d 931, 936 (1999) (the 
requirement of "sex offender registration [now addressed by Rule 11(d)(2)] is a 
collateral, not direct, consequence of pleading guilty"); State v. Tinico-Perez, 145 
Idaho 400, 179 P.3d 363 (Ct. App. 2008) (citation omitted) ("[T]he risk of 
deportation or other impact on immigration status [now addressed by Rule 
11(d)(1)] is generally considered a "collateral consequence" of a criminal 
conviction. "). The failure to advise a defendant of these collateral 
consequences, when they apply, undoubtedly constitutes a technical violation of 
the rule. However, because the procedures embodied in Rule 11 (d) are not 
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constitutionally required, see, Q.&, Ray, 133 Idaho at 99-101, 982 P .2d 934-96; 
State v. Huffman, 137 Idaho 886, 887, 55 P.3d 879, 880 (Ct. App. 2002), it 
follows that a violation of Rule 11 (d), like a violation of Rule 11 (c), does not rise 
to the level of a due process violation rendering the defendant's plea involuntary. 
Flowers argues in conclusory fashion that, even if the court's failure to 
advise him of the sex offender registration requirement as required by Rule 
11 (d)(2) did not constitute a due process violation, its failure to do so 
nevertheless resulted in a manifest injustice entitling him to withdraw his plea. 
(Supplemental Brief, pp.19-20.) Flowers appears to claim he was prejudiced 
simply by the virtue of the fact that the court did not comply with the rule. 
Flowers, however, has never contended that he was not actually aware of the 
sex offender registration requirements at the time he entered his plea. 
Moreover, it is evident from the record that Flowers was aware of the registration 
requirement before he was sentenced on his plea. At the sentencing hearing, 
the court specifically asked Flowers: "[S]o you realize that you'll have to register 
as a sex offender then, right?" (12/15/08 Tr., p.15, Ls.1-2.) Flowers responded: 
"Yes, sir. As long as I'm on probation and even after, if you don't give me a 
withheld judgment." (12/15/08 Tr., p.15, Ls.3-4.) Because Flowers proceeded to 
sentencing despite being actually aware of the requirement that he register as a 
sex offender, he cannot successfully claim on appeal any injustice arising from 
the court's failure to comply with Rule 11 (d)(2) at the change of plea hearing. 
The reasoning of United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74 
(2004), is instructive. In Dominguez Benitez, the United States Supreme Court 
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held that a defendant who seeks reversal of his conviction after a guilty plea, on 
the ground that the district court committed plain error under Federal Criminal 
Rule 11, must show a reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not 
have entered the plea. In so holding, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth 
Circuit, which had held that the district court's failure to issue a particular warning 
pursuant to Federal Rule 11(c) required reversal of the defendant's conviction. 
The Supreme Court explained the reasoning behind adopting such a rule: 
First, the standard should enforce the policies that underpin 
Rule 52(b) generally, to encourage timely objections and reduce 
wasteful reversals by demanding strenuous exertion to get relief for 
unpreserved error. Second, it should respect the particular 
importance of the finality of guilty pleas, which usually rest, after all, 
in a defendant's profession of guilty in open court, and are 
indispensable in the operation of the modern criminal justice 
system. And in this case, these reasons are complemented by the 
fact, worth repeating, that the violation was of Rule 11, not of due 
process. 
Flowers, like Dominguez, did not timely object to the alleged failure to 
comply with Rule 11. Flowers, like Dominguez, has not shown a violation of due 
process, but only a technical violation of Rule 11. Flowers, like Dominguez, has 
failed to show that the court's alleged failure made any difference whatsoever 
with respect to his decision to enter a guilty plea. To the contrary, the record 
shows that Flowers was aware of the registration requirement at least as of the 
date of sentencing and expressed no desire to withdraw his plea. Thus, despite 
the fact that the court overlooked the requirement of Rule 11 (d)(2) before 
accepting Flowers' plea, Flowers has nevertheless failed to show that such an 
oversight rose to the level of manifest injustice entitling him to withdraw his plea. 
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3. Flowers' Claim That The State Breached The Plea Agreement At 
Sentencing Is Without Merit And Does Not Show Any Manifest 
Injustice Entitling Him To Withdraw His Plea 
At sentencing, Flowers moved to strike a portion of the PSI that referred to 
an admission Flowers had made to the presentence investigator in relation to 
one of the" charges that had been dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement in 
this case. Specifically, Flowers moved to strike the statement in the PSI that 
"Flowers did indicate during our interview that he touched the breasts of A.T., 14-
year-old female in dismissed charge." (PSI, p.11; 12/15/08 Tr., p.6, Ls.7-18.) In 
response to Flowers' motion to strike, the prosecutor argued: 
Your Honor, I think the Court can give it whatever weight's 
necessary. I would note for the record that that particular individual 
is in the courtroom here today, with her mother. While they 
understand they are not entitled to give a witness impact 
statement, I think the Court can take into consideration the entire 
facts regarding the situation. While there was a plea agreement, I 
think the Court has a right to understand everything that went on 
with Mr. Flowers so it can sentence him appropriately, based upon 
all the facts. 
(12/15/08 Tr., p.7, Ls.3-11.) Subsequently, while making his sentencing 
recommendation, the prosecutor argued: "When we're talking about somebody 
with this prior record, with this type of conduct, and all the other conducts that 
was [sic] surrounded this particular case, this is not a person that should be in 
our community. He is a risk to young ladies." (12/15/08 Tr., p.17, Ls.22-25.) 
As a basis for withdrawing his guilty plea, Flowers argued that, by 
commenting on the dismissed charges at sentencing, the prosecutor breached 
the plea agreement by "not being reasonably consistent with the agreement and 
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their recommendation to dismiss two other charges and not use them against me 
later." (Affidavit, p.2; see also Motion, p.2.) Flowers reasserts this argument on 
appeal, contending that "regardless of whether or not the court could sua sponte 
consider [the dismissed charges], the state acted inconsistently with its promise 
to Mr. Flowers when it argued that the court could and should do so." 
(Supplemental Brief, p.12.) Flowers has failed to show any breach of the plea 
agreement entitling him to withdraw his plea. 
A plea agreement is contractual in nature and must be measured by 
contract law standards. State v. Lampien, 148 Idaho 367, _, 223 P.3d 750, 
759 (2010); State v. Claxton, 128 Idaho 782,785,918 P.2d 1227, 1230 (Ct. App. 
1996). In making a sentencing recommendation pursuant to a plea agreement, 
the state is bound to honor the letter of the agreement and behave consistently 
with the terms of the agreement. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 
(1971); State v. Lankford, 127 Idaho 608,903 P.2d 1305 (1995). The burden is 
on the defendant to show that the prosecutor's overall argument disavowed or 
was fundamentally at odds with the position the state was obligated to take 
pursuant to the plea agreement. Lankford, 127 Idaho at 617,903 P.2d at 1314 
(sentence vacated because the state's comments at sentencing were 
"fundamentally at odds with the position the state was obligated to recommend"); 
State v. Jones, 139 Idaho 299, 303, 77 P.3d 988, 992 (2003) (sentence vacated 
because the prosecutor's comments "effectively disavowed" the 
recommendation). Consistent with this standard, the state's recommendation 
may include information that is unfavorable to the defendant if the information is 
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relevant to the court's sentencing determination, and may remind the court of the 
applicable legal standards. State v. Brooke, 134 Idaho 807,810, 10 P.3d 756, 
759 (Ct. App. 2000) (discussion of findings contained in the presentencing 
psychosexual evaluation does not constitute breach of a plea agreement); State 
v. Richards, 127 Idaho 31, 40, 896 P.2d 357, 366 (Ct. App. 1995) ("Unless the 
State has specifically agreed to the contrary, the prosecutor may legitimately 
refer to information relevant to the sentencing determination and may permissibly 
refer to the objectives of sentencing."). 
The plea agreement in this case was not reduced to writing. However, the 
terms of agreement were articulated by the parties at the change of plea hearing, 
as follows: 
[Defense Counsel): Yes, Your Honor, we do have a plea 
agreement on this man, also. He [Flowers) is going to plead guilty 
to statutory rape. The State's going to recommend three fixed, 
seven indeterminate and they're going to dismiss all other charges 
in all other cases. We're free to make our own recommendations 
at sentencing. 
[Prosecutor): That's correct, Your Honor, I would move at 
this time, pursuant to that agreement, to dismiss counts two and 
three of the information. 
(11/10108 Tr., p.1, Ls.13-22.) In addition, Flowers completed and signed a guilty 
plea questionnaire in which he represented his understanding of the terms of the 
plea agreement as: "Drop count 2 & 3, plead guilty to Rape, 3-7 yrs prison, 
Defense free to recomend whatever deemed necessary." (R., p.164 
(punctuation added, spelling and abbreviations original).) 
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The parties' obligations under the plea agreement are unambiguous. 
Pursuant to the agreement, Flowers was required to plead guilty to rape, and the 
state was required to dismiss all other charges, which it did, and to recommend a 
specific sentence. (R., p.164; 11/10108 Tr., p.1, Ls.13-22.) 
Flowers now contends that the state was also obligated under the 
agreement not to comment on the charges it dismissed. (Supplemental Brief, 
pp.12-13.) To support this assertion, Flowers points to the following comments 
made by his trial attorney at sentencing: "I guess I'm concerned - is we have a 
plea agreement. The state's bound by the plea agreement, and they're bound to 
go along with certain recommendations and not comment on charges that have 
been dismissed." (12/15/08 Tr., p.7, Ls.12-15.) Flowers' appellate counsel 
interprets these comments as an express declaration "that under the plea 
agreement the state was bound not to comment on the dismissed charges." 
(Supplemental Brief, p.12.) Such an interpretation is not warranted, however, 
because it is clear from the parties' articulation of the agreement at the entry of 
plea hearing, and from Flowers' own understanding of the terms of the 
agreement, as reflected in his guilty plea questionnaire, that such a term was 
never part of the agreement. It is also clear from the context of defense 
counsel's comments at sentencing that defense counsel was merely opining that 
the state should not comment on the charges it agreed to dismiss, much like he 
opined that the court should not even consider the dismissed charges, even 
though it was clearly entitled to do so. See,~, State v. Thomas, 133 Idaho 
800, 804, 992 P.2d 795, 799 (Ct. App. 1999) (citations omitted) ("[I]t is well 
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established that a sentencing court may, with appropriate caution, consider a 
defendant's alleged criminal conduct for which he has not been convicted or for 
which charges have been dismissed,"), 
-' 
This is not a case, as Flowers suggests, like State v, Peterson, _ Idaho 
226 P,3d 535 (2010), where the state was bound by the defendant's 
understanding of the plea agreement because the prosecutor stood silent in the 
face of defense counsel's representation at the change of plea hearing regarding 
the meaning of an ambiguous term, Defense counsel in this case recited the 
terms of the plea agreement at the change of plea hearing and neither he nor 
Flowers (nor the prosecutor, for that matter) ever indicated that the agreement 
bound the state to not comment on the charges it agreed to dismiss, Defense 
counsel's subsequent statement of opinion at sentencing that the prosecutor 
should not be permitted to comment on the dismissed charges did not alter the 
terms of the otherwise unambiguous agreement. 
There was no requirement under the agreement that the state not 
comment on the dismissed charges, Nor did the comments the prosecutor made 
at sentencing in any way disavow the position the state was obligated to take 
pursuant to the plea agreement. The prosecutor accurately advised the court in 
response to Flowers' motion to strike that the court was entitled to consider 
dismissed charges and to give them whatever weight it deemed appropriate, 
Thomas, 133 Idaho at 804, 992 P,2d at 799, The prosecutor's response was not 
a comment on the dismissed charges at all and was in no way inconsistent with 
its obligations under the plea agreement. Nor did the prosecutor undermine the 
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agreement by stating during argument that Flowers should not be in the 
community in light of "all the other conducts" surrounding this case. The 
promised recommendation was for prison. Pointing out that a prison sentence 
was appropriate in light of all the facts the case did not undermine the 
sentencing recommendation but, rather, properly buttressed it against defense 
counsel's recommendation for probation. See State v. Halbesleben, 147 Idaho 
161, 206 P.3d 867 (Ct. App. 2009) (prosecutor's vigorous argument and 
reference to facts of crimes did not undermine or impliedly disavow sentencing 
recommendation, but properly buttressed it against any argument from defense 
counsel that a lesser sentence was warranted). 
Flowers has failed to show that the prosecutor breached the plea 
agreement at sentencing and has therefore failed to show he is entitled to 
withdraw his plea on that basis. 
4. Flowers' Claim That The State Breached The Plea Aareement Bv 
Opposing His Rule 35 Motion Is Without Merit And Does Not Show 
Any Manifest Injustice Entitling Him To Withdraw His Plea 
At sentencing the state, in accordance with its promise to do so, 
recommended a sentence of three years determinate, followed by seven years 
indeterminate. (12/15/08 Tr., p.18, Ls.3-5.) The district court ultimately imposed 
a sentence of 15 years, with five years determinate. (R., pp.168-70; 12/15/08 
Tr., p.22, Ls.6-14.) Flowers filed a Rule 35 motion, requesting that the sentence 
be reduced to that recommended by the state at sentencing. (R., pp.171-72.) 
The state opposed motion, arguing that the sentence imposed was reasonable. 
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(1/26/09 Tr., pA, Ls.12-25.) The court denied Flowers' request for leniency. (R., 
pp.181 a-181 b.) 
Flowers argues, as he did below, that prosecutor's agreement to 
recommend a sentence of 10 years with three years determinate effectively 
barred the state from opposing his Rule 35 motion to reduce the sentence 
ultimately imposed. (Supplemental Brief, pp.14-16; Motion, p.2; Affidavit, p.2.) 
Flowers' claim does not withstand scrutiny. The prosecutor's obligation to 
recommend a specific sentence at sentencing did not preclude the prosecutor 
from asserting at a post-sentencing hearing that Flowers' sentence was 
reasonable as imposed. 
"The determination of whether the state breached a plea agreement by its 
conduct at a post-sentencing proceeding 'generally tums on the language of the 
plea agreement itself; and where that language is ambiguous, the ambiguity will 
be resolved in favor of the defendant. '" State v. Fuhriman, 137 Idaho 741, 745, 
52 P.3d 886, 890 (Ct. App. 2002) (quoting State v. Cole, 135 Idaho 269, 272, 16 
P.3d 945, 948 (Ct. App. 2000). In Fuhriman, the defendant pled guilty pursuant 
to a plea agreement whereby the parties agreed jointly to recommend "not more 
than a rider." Fuhriman, 137 Idaho at 743, 52 P.3d at 888. On appeal from his 
conviction, Fuhriman argued that the state breached the plea agreement by 
opposing his Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence. lsi. at 745, 52 P.3d at 
890. The Idaho Court of Appeals rejected this argument and held: 
Having already concluded that the plea agreement was not 
ambiguous, we decline Fuhriman's invitation to imply additional 
terms, viz., that the state was prohibited from opposing his Rule 35 
motion, that the parties did not articulate at the time the agreement 
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was entered. Further, the record does not indicate that the state 
made any affirmative sentencing recommendation at the Rule 35 
hearing. Instead, it merely argued that the court's previous 
sentence was reasonable. 
The reasoning and result of Fuhriman apply equally to this case. As 
articulated by defense counsel at the change of plea hearing, the plea 
agreement in this case required the state "to recommend three fixed, seven 
indeterminate," with the defense being "free to make our own recommendations 
at sentencing." (11/10108 Tr., p.1, La.14-18; see also R., p.164 (guilty plea 
questionnaire).) As in Fuhriman, at no time did the parties to the agreement ever 
articulate as an additional requirement that the state would be prohibited from 
opposing Flowers' Rule 35 motion, nor can such a term reasonably be implied in 
light of defense counsel's own representation that the recommendations 
contemplated by the agreement were to be made "at sentencing." Further, as in 
Fuhriman, the record shows that the state did not make any affirmative 
sentencing recommendation at the Rule 35 hearing but, instead, merely argued 
that the sentence imposed by the court was reasonable. (1/26/09 Tr., pA, Ls.12-
25.) Because the state never agreed to give up its right to oppose Flowers' Rule 
35 motion, Flowers has failed to show that the state breached the plea 
agreement by arguing that his sentence was reasonable as imposed. 
State v. Lampien, 148 Idaho 367, 223 P.3d 750 (2010), relied upon by 
Flowers, is distinguishable. In Lampien, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the 
state was obligated to adhere to its promised sentencing recommendation at 
every stage of the proceedings based on the broad and "somewhat unusual 
20 
language of the plea agreement," which provided, "[t]he State and Defendant 
agree to be bound to following sentence agreement." hl.,. at _, 367 P.3d at 
761. As set forth above, however, the language of the parties' plea agreement is 
not nearly as broad in this case. The agreement called for the state to 
recommend specific sentence but, unlike the agreement in Lampien, it did not 
"bind" the state to the sentencing recommendation for all time. Thus, despite 
Flowers' assertions to the contrary, nothing in the plea agreement between 
Flowers and the state prohibited the prosecutor from asserting at the hearing on 
Flowers' Rule 35 motion that Flowers' sentence was reasonable as imposed. 
Flowers has failed to show any breach of the plea agreement entitling him to 
withdraw his plea. 
II. 
Flowers Has Failed To Establish An Abuse Of The Sentencing Court's Discretion 
A. Introduction 
Flowers argues that the unified sentence of 15 years, with five years fixed, 
imposed upon his guilty plea to rape is unduly harsh and excessive. (Appellant's 
Brief, pp.3-8.) The record, however, clearly supports the sentence imposed; 
Flowers has failed to establish an abuse of discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On review of a district court's sentencing determination, the question 
before this Court is not what sentence it would have imposed, but rather, 
whether the district court abused its discretion. State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 
148-49,191 P.3d 217, 226-27 (2008) (citing State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565,568, 
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650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982)). The length of a sentence is reviewed under 
an abuse of discretion standard considering the defendant's entire sentence. 
State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing State v. 
Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002); State v. Huffman, 144 
Idaho 201, 159 P.3d 838 (2007)). It is presumed that the fixed portion of the 
sentence will be the defendant's probable term of confinement. l.li (citing State 
v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)). 
c. Flowers Has Failed To Establish That His Sentence Is Excessive Under 
Any Reasonable View Of The Facts 
Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden 
of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 
576,577,38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831,11 
P.3d 27 (2000)). To carry this burden the appellant must show that the sentence 
is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Baker, 136 Idaho at 577, 
38 P.3d at 615. A sentence is reasonable, however, if it appears necessary to 
achieve the primary objective of protecting society or any of the related 
sentencing goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution. l.li 
Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden 
of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 
576,577,38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 
P.3d 27 (2000)). To carry this burden the appellant must show that the sentence 
is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Baker, 136 Idaho at 577, 
38 P.3d at 615. A sentence is reasonable, however, if it appears necessary to 
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achieve the primary objective of protecting society or any of the related 
sentencing goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution. k!.c Contrary to 
Flowers' assertions on appeal, the facts of this case, combined with Flowers' 
criminal history, warrant the sentence imposed. 
One day after befriending 16-year-old AC., 24-year-old Flowers engaged 
her in a sexual relationship. (PSI, p.2.) The misconduct began when Flowers 
and AC. were swimming, at which time Flowers "hugg[ed] and French kiss[ed]" 
AC., "unsnapped her bra from behind," and "reached down from the front of her 
shirt" and removed her bra "through the neck of her tank top." (PSI, p.2.) AC. 
was obviously uncomfortable with Flowers' advances because, from that point 
forward, "she kept her distance from him and ... cover[ed] her breasts with her 
hands." (PSI, p.2.) Nevertheless, just two to three hours later, while at AC.'s 
home, Flowers began making out with AC. and the two removed their clothes. 
(PSI, p.2.) After they were both naked, Flowers "pushed his penis into [AC.'s] 
mouth," where she allowed it to remain for approximately 15 seconds. (PSI, p.2.) 
Flowers then inserted his penis into AC.'s vagina and had unprotected sexual 
intercourse with her. (PSI, p.2.) 
Although Flowers has never before been convicted of a sex offense, his 
conduct in this case is in keeping with history of generally victimizing others. His 
criminal record includes convictions for criminal mischief, residential entry, three 
batteries, use of telephone to terrify/harass, malicious injury to property, stalking, 
trespass, and violation of a no contact order. (PSI, pp.4-5.) In addition, although 
the charges were dismissed, police received information from two other girls that 
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Flowers had sexually abused them within the same week he had sexual 
intercourse with A.C. (R., pp.27, 31, 79-80.) 
In a mental health evaluation prepared at Flowers' request, the evaluator 
., 
concluded it was unlikely that Flowers suffers from a severe and reliably 
diagnosable mental illness. (Mental Health Assessment, p.1.) The evaluator 
determined, instead, that "Flowers' unresolved issues primarily appear to be his 
resentment towards authority and poor boundary issues with females." (Mental 
Health Assessment, p.3.) The evaluator continued: 
He reports prior behavioral pattems of destroying females' property 
after challenging issues emerged during the relationship. when 
queried as to how violence toward females' possessions had 
graduated into his participation into physical aggression toward 
females, he became somewhat minimal in his expressions and 
responses. 
.... It appears that the above mentioned unresolved issues are 
negatively impacting his social, familial, and legal functioning. 
(Mental Health Assessment, p.3.) The presentence investigator concurred with 
the evaluator's assessment of Flowers' mental condition and concluded, "This 
poor boundary issue with females coupled with his resentment towards authority 
is very concerning as it presents alarming concerns for any and all young 
females." (PSI, p.11.) 
In fashioning an appropriate sentence, the district court considered the 
nature of the offense, the harm done to the victim, and the risk Flowers presents 
to the community. The court stated, "It has to be a punishment to deter you from 
doing this again and, perhaps, others. It there [sic] has to be - I have to 
consider the protection of society and rehabilitation. I also have to consider the 
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effect your conduct had on the victim here" (12/15/08 Tr., p.21, Ls.14-17), and 
ultimately concluded, "I think this conduct here, and your conduct, doesn't 
warrant you being placed on probation and it certainly doesn't warrant receiving 
a rider. It warrants a correctional institution" (12/15/08 Tr., p.22, Ls.6-9). 
Flowers does not dispute any of the information in the PSI or materials 
before the court at sentencing. Nevertheless, he contends that the district court 
abused its discretion by imposing a 15-year sentence, with five years fixed, 
because, according to Flowers, "all the goals of sentencing could have been 
accomplished with a rider, or at worst, the 10 year sentence recommended by 
;"" 
the state." (Appellant's Brief, p.7.) That Flowers believes a lesser sentence 
would have achieved the goals of sentencing does not, however, show an abuse 
of discretion. On appeal, the question is not what sentence Flowers would have 
like the court to have imposed, or even what sentence this Court would have 
imposed, but rather, whether the sentence was excessive under any reasonable 
view of the facts. State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148-49, 191 P.3d 217, 226-
27 (2008) (citing State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. 
App. 1982)). In light of Flowers' conduct in this case, his unresolved boundary 
issues and resentment toward authority, and his long history of generally 
victimizing other people, the district court could and did reasonably determine 
that a unified 15-year sentence, with five years fixed, was necessary to achieve 
the goals of sentencing. 
Flowers' claim (see Appellant's Brief, pp. 7-8) that the district court did not 
adequately articulate its reasons for imposing the sentence it did also fails to 
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show an abuse of discretion. First, as set forth above, the district court did 
articulate its reasons for imposing the sentence and, in doing so, specifically 
considered the objectives of deterrence, rehabilitation and protection of society. 
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the fact that the court did not articulate 
its reasoning to Flowers' satisfaction does not show the sentence was arbitrary. 
Even where the "sentencing judge has set forth no reasons for the imposition of 
a particular sentence, [the appellate court] will draw [its] own impressions from 
the record and affirm what [it] infer[s] to be a reasonable exercise of the lower 
court's discretion in pronouncing the sentence under review." State v. Martinez, 
122 Idaho 158,163,832 P.2d 331, 336 (Ct. App. 1997). Because the sentence 
imposed by the district court in this case is supported by the record, Flowers has 
failed to establish an abuse of sentencing discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Flowers' sentence 
and the district court's order denying Flowers' motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 
DATED this 6th day of May 2010. 
.Q 
LORI A. FLEMING 
Deputy Attorney G neral 
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